Abstract. "Trustworthy data" is the fuel for ensuring transparent traceability, precise decision-making, and cogent coordination in the supply chain (SC) space. However, the disparate data silos act as a trade barrier in orchestrating the provenance of product story starting from the transformation of raw materials into the circuit board to the assembling of electronic components into end products available on the store shelf for customers. Therefore, to bridge the fragmented siloed information across global supply chain partners, the diffusion of blockchain (BC) as one of the advanced distributed ledger technology (DLT) takeover the on-premise legacy systems. Nevertheless, the challenging constraints of blockchain including scalability, accessing off-line data, fee-less microtransactions and many more lead to the third wave of blockchain called IOTA. In this paper, we propose a framework for supporting provenance in the electronic supply chain (ECS) by using permissioned IOTA ledger. Realizing the crucial requirement of trustworthy data, we use Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM) channel provided by IOTA that allows the SC players to procure distributed information while keeping confidential trade flows, tamper-proof data, and fine-grained accessibility rights. To identify operational disruption, we devise a transparent product ledger through transaction data and consignment information to keep track of the complete product journey at each intermediary step during SC processes. Furthermore, we evaluate the secure provenance data construction time for varying payload size.
Introduction
Electronic Supply Chain (ESC) revolves around an intricate and intensive process during which raw materials or natural resources are transformed into circuit boards and electronic components, integrated and assembled into end products, and ultimately available on the shelf stores for customers. During the product evolution journey, the data diffusion as Provenance Data across multiple SC participating entities can enable the enterprises to choreograph their demand-supply circle, figure out win-win circumstances, perform risk assessment, maximize revenues and forecast their future goals. Reliance on provenance is considered to be an effective mechanism as it tracks the complete lineage of data during acquisition, processing, transmission, and reception phases. Thus, provenance ensures the integrity of data during data debugging, reconciliation, replication, decision making, performance tuning, auditing, and forensic analysis [1] [2] [3] [4] . However, procuring product provenance data is a baffling and exhaustive task due to disparate data silos, complexity of data aggregation, and on-premise operational practices and procedures. Furthermore, relying on collated data gathered from a sheer variety of distinct sources to infer reliable information and execute critical decision-making processes demands the originator of data as well as the intermediate actors playing with data to be trustworthy and transparent.
Due to the unavailability of a platform which can provide traceability solutions to access the data oceans holding complete information about the product life cycle, the consumers are helpless to differentiate between reliable and counterfeit products. The proliferation of counterfeit products is deteriorating consumer trust and also causing reputational damage to the company's name across the globe. For instance, defense system manufacturers face difficulty in detecting counterfeit items, as counterfeiters attempt to imitate materials, part numbers, and serial numbers to simulate authentic parts [5] . One such event occurred in 2006 when the Japanese electronics company "NEC" took two years to uncover an elaborate chain that was, in effect, faking the company's entire product lines 1 . Similarly, integrated circuits (IC) counterfeiting has turned up in many industrial sectors including computer, telecommunications, and automotive electronics [6] . The legitimate electronics companies miss out on about $100 billion of global revenue every year due to counterfeiting [7] . To mitigate risk effectively across the SC, either atomistic sources of risk is required that involves scrutinizing a restricted part of the SC and is suitable for low-value and less complex components or holistic sources of risk are required that involves a comprehensive analysis of the SC and is preferable for high-value and complex components [8] . In either of the cases, contingency planning is required to identify the root cause of operational disruption and to identify the fraudulent middleman.
With the arrival of distributed ledger technology (DLT), visionary growers, processors, wholesalers, distributors, retailers, and others become capable of enhancing visibility and accountability throughout the SC to support transparency, collaboration, longevity, and security. Furthermore, it brings the SC to the shopper enabling customers to dive deep beyond the label and use their purchasing power to drive real change. In this regard, the core idea of blockchain-based architecture as DLT has been used in many application areas including agriculture or food products [9] [10] [11] [12] , aviation industry, [13] , and many other uses cases discussed in [14] to solve the issues associated with legacy systems. However, it is still facing challenges such as scalability, off-line capability, and transaction fee. To address these limitations, IOTA [15] brings a digital transformation in the third generation DLT technology.
In this paper, we have focused on formulating an IOTA-based framework for supporting provenance in the ESC. By integrating MAM protocol on the top of IOTA (as shown in 1), the proposed framework provides transparent traceability of data throughout the SC ensuring trustworthy and quality data.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
-We investigate the significance of integrating provenance in the ESC. We also address the research gaps and highlight the key factors for adopting IOTA in the SC in comparison to the BC. -For product traceability, we propose an IOTA-based provenance framework that encloses the diverse product story as provenance data at each intermediary process in the ESC, thereby solving the fragmented and asymmetric information issues. -We exploit MAM channel to ensure confidential trade flow among competitors. Moreover, it preserves data integrity, and fine-grained data access to the trusted SC players only. -Finally, we present a systematic evolution of supply chain system i.e., from legacy systems to DLT in the SC space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of IOTA and SC. Section 3 discusses the significance for the integration of IOTA to support provenance in SC. Section 4 introduces the system model. Section 5 describes the proposed IOTA framework for the ESC. Section 6 presents the simulation results. Section 7 discusses the security analysis of our approach. Section 8 surveys related work, and finally, Section 9 concludes the paper. 
Background
In this section, we provide a quick overview of the key terms in IOTA and SC. 
IOTA
IOTA is a public, permissionless, and a distributed ledger that leverages directed acyclic graph (DAG) data structure termed as Tangle for storing interlinked but individual transactions exchanged among peers [15] . Fig. 2 shows a Tangle graph where each square-block represents a transaction/site which is propagated by a node. Every new transaction attached to the Tangle graph forms an edge set. In order to create a transaction, a node (i) creates and signs a transaction with its private key, (ii) use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm [16] to choose and validate two other non-conflicting unconfirmed transactions (tips), and (iii) solve a cryptographic puzzle (knows as hashcash [17] ) to perform Proof of Work (PoW) for preventing Sybil attack. A transaction status can be categorized as confirmed transactions (green nodes), uncertain transactions (red nodes) and unconfirmed transactions or tips (grey nodes) as shown in Fig. 2 .
The revolutionary features of IOTA including scalability, decentralization, zero transaction fee, speedy microtransactions, off-line capability, and quantum security enables it to gain ground not only in Machine to Machine (M2M) economy but also in application areas encompassing Internet of Things (IoT).
Supply Chain System
Supply chain management system encompasses coordination and collaboration among channel partners (suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers) for planning and managing of upstream and downstream processbased activities such as the transformation of natural resources/raw materials, sourcing, procurement, production, conversion, and logistics [18] . Fig. 3 shows the primary players participating in a sand to hand story of mobile phones in the ESC. 
Provenance: Product Story
In order to ensure transparent logistical planning and to preserve the integrity of the SC, provenance plays a significant role in providing a trustworthy, authenticated and accurate data lineage to unlock the product chronicle at deep-tier level. The provenance data enables the participating buyers and sellers to trace the product from its inventory procurement process to its point of sale stage and hence provides an efficient and feasible way for tackling counterfeits or false claims from untrustworthy parties.
IOTA: Orchestrating Episodes of Product Story
Relying solely on provenance to notch trustworthy data would be a mission "Impossible", therefore, in order to efficiently and proactively systematize the product story in terms of provenance data, we collocate the product story episodes in a tamper-proof product ledger perpetuated by IOTA. IOTA is a promising technology that could play an indispensable role in providing salient features desirable for a supply chain including decentralized, distributed and inter-operable data stream to consortium members. Furthermore, it provides data auditability to identify accountable actors causing data contamination, reasonable confidentiality and privacy of the trade flows, facilitating access control on immutable and trustworthy data. In essence, coalescing real-time provenance data through resource-constrained sensors (such as track and trace of precise location information, transfer of custody, monitoring environmental conditions or temperature fluctuations during storing and shipping product through GPS, RFID tags, temperature sensors, humidity sensors etc.) that can drive decision-making power during risk mitigation forecasting.
3.3 Why Say "NO" to Blockchain and "YES" to IOTA in the Supply Chain Space?
IOTA flared a paradigm shift in the third wave of blockchain by providing a solution to the challenging constraints encountered by the BC. In essence, the IOTA platform exhibits the following salient features essential to SC in contrast to BC.
Scalability:
In the supply chain space, transaction load is expected to increase based on the actors and activities in the network over time. Traditional blockchain runs into scaling snag as the transactions and the validation of said transactions are siloed and often at odds with each other. A permissioned blockchain has the potential to scale to a few hundred nodes [19] , which may affect the latency and throughput of the network. To address the problem of scalability, [19] [20] [21] used the concept of sharding single BC ledger i.e., processing of transactions is distributed across multiple nodes in parallel. However, IOTA scales horizontally and thus resolves the problem of scalability without any need to take care of global and local ledgers.
2. IOTA for IoT: Cost effective miniaturized things or objects with computational and networking capabilities are providing promising solutions to optimize the tracking events in the supply cycle. However, IoT-linked security crisis may breach the system security making it vulnerable to attacks, for instance, on October, 2016 a US-based DNS provider, "Dyn" experienced a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) through Mirai malware that utilizes weak or default passwords web cameras and digital video recorders, manufactured by China-based Hangzhou Xiongmai Technologies [22] . Under such catastrophic circumstances, it is difficult to determine the devices' owners. To cope with such situations, IOTA provides a high end-to-end security level called Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM) protocol that facilitates encrypted data communication and securely anchors it to the Tangle in a quantum proof fashion. Moreover, through the MAM channel, access privileges can be tailored, thereby making it a perfect platform to build tomorrow's trade facilitation systems in supply chain space.
3. Off-line Transaction: IOTA supports off-line capability for handling scenarios such as information retrieval from remote areas and sensors on a container of a freighter ship that losses connectivity during ocean transportation. This mechanism is called "partitioning" during which a Tangle in IOTA can get branch off by creating an off-line cluster and back into the network upon Internet connectivity thereby, securing the local transactions.
Speedy and Zero Fee Transactions without Miners:
Based on the concept "users equal to validators", IOTA is free from miners and hence does not charge any transaction fee. Furthermore, by enabling transactions to be validated in parallel, IOTA has the highest transactions per second among other distributed ledger.
Machines with Wallets:
IOTA has powered the resource-constrained devices to participate in the machine to machine (M2M) world. Being a powerful catalyst in M2M economy, it allows machines to interact seamlessly and instantly transact with each other through its bi-directional off-Tangle payment channel called "Flash Channel " allowing massive volumes of nano and microtransactions [23] . One such electric autonomous vehicle example scenario is suggested in [24] . Thus, IOTA can enable the automotive to pay autonomously for services including parking, charging batteries, tolls taxes, usage-based insurances and many more 2 (as shown in Fig. 4 ). On September 2018, the Netherlands successfully completes testing for electric car charging station using IOTA 3 . Another practical application of a digital twin with IOTA is CarPass 4 for vehicles telematics data (e.g. mileage, trips, environmental, maintenance data) 5 . 6. Quantum Immune: IOTA uses the Winternitz One-Time Signature Scheme [25] which is a quantum-resistant algorithm. Nonetheless, there is an ongoing debate on the ability of blockchain to survive against quantum computers 6,7 .
System Model
In this section, we describe the network model and the data model that we consider for our proposed IOTA-based provenance scheme for SC. We also present the provenance model along with the outline of elemental provenance data components that are utilized in our proposed scheme. Finally, we discuss the security goals that our proposed scheme aims to achieve.
Network Model
The network model consists of participating and non-participating players of the SC as follows: The raw producers provide raw materials to the supplier in order to produce chip-sets and other peripherals. Those components are fabricated and assembled at a manufacturing unit. The finished products (for instance, mobile phones) are delivered to the warehouses for distribution. Finally, customers are able to purchase them from retailers or mobile phone service providers.
Non-participating players Customers, (ii) Researchers.
Non-participating members including customers and researchers are not involved in SC process however, they may need to fetch the production and manufacturing information about the products. Hence, they are also considered as part of our network model.
Data Model
We assume that each SC entity acts as a Data Publisher (D p ) and publishes its data on its MAM channel identified by Channel ID . On the other hand, the interested viewers act as a Data Receiver (D r ) and subscribe to the desired channel (C) to gain access to the data by using an authorization key (K). The term K is collectively used for public K pu and private K pr key pairs. MAM provides a channel where data owner who publishes the data and data viewers who subscribe, meet. The technical details of the MAM channel are discussed in Section 5.1.
In the context of SC, D p and D r can be referred to as Seller and Buyer respectively. The data (also referred as payload) consists of (i) Transaction data T Data , and (ii) Auxiliary data A Data can be represented as:
for instance, if a supplier is delivering material or parts to the manufacturer, then T Data consist of transaction ID (T ID ), supplier ID (Supplier ID ), and consignment information (Con inf o ). Con inf o may include batch ID (B ID ), component ID (C ID ), make and model number as depicted in Fig. 5 and Fig. 9 . A Data consists of sensor data S Data (location information as source, destination , temperature, humidity), quality control information (QC), timestamp, and warranty.
Provenance Model
Deriving the product story involves assembling provenance data from payload's transaction and auxiliary data. The key factors to devise product provenance are T ID , P roduct ID (aka Serial#), and Channel ID . However, the additional information can be obtained from T Data and A Data accordingly. To obtain the provenance data (P Data ), the data from T Data and A Data can be fetched as represented in eq. (2c). A Quick Response (QR) code is affixed with the shelf display of any electronic product, containing instant information link about the product. Upon scanning the QR code, the consumer can glean product story. 
Security Goals
Our proposed scheme aims to achieve the following security properties:
The data is stored on the channel in encrypted form. Hence, only those D r having access to the Channel ID and authorization key (K) can obtain and decipher the payload. 2. Access Control Rights: To conceal classified trade information between competitors, it is essential to define access control rights on the data published on the channel. Defining access rights (i.e., grant and revoke) on data is based on an authorization key (K) used in the restricted mode. The key is exchanged with the legitimate SC players only and can be changed to revoke access rights without any need to change the Channel ID . The other modes provided by MAM channel includes public and private. Further details related to the MAM channel are provided in Section 5.1. 3. Ownership Proof: To avoid any random user to jumble up the MAM channel of any data publisher, signature validation is performed. 4. Forward Secrecy: To enforce forward secrecy, the subscriber can only locate and retrieve transactions at or after their point of entry in the channel, but not before their point of entry (as shown in Fig. 6 ). 5. Forward Transaction Linking: Upon locating the transaction t n , the subscriber can retrieve the address of the next transaction t n+1 (as shown in Fig. 6 ). 5 Framework: Procuring Provenance in SC Through IOTA
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the characteristics and working of MAM protocol. We also devise the proposed framework for provenance in SC using IOTA with the help of algorithms and flow diagrams. 
Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM)
In order to ensure secure, encrypted and authenticated data stream on the Tangle, Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM) module is proposed. Using the gossip protocol, the message from Data publisher is propagated through the network and can be access by the channel subscribers only.
Generating Message Chain A MAM transaction bundle consists of two sections including (i)
Signature, (ii) MAM. Fig. 8 shows the main components of MAM Transaction Bundle. The "MAM section" contains the masked message. In order to post a masked message, MAM deploys Merkle tree based signature scheme that requires the creation of a root to view the payload. Furthermore, to support forward transaction linking, MAM section also contains a connecting pointer i.e.,nextRoot and other associated entities that are required for fetching the next payload. The approach to access the payload depends on the channel mode used, for instance, restricted channel mode requires authorization key pairs to encode and decode messages.
For validity check of MAM section, data publishers add a signature in the MAM bundle and store it in the signatureMessageFragment(sMF) of the trans-action. Such transactions are called as "Signature section" in MAM bundle. A comprehensive working of MAM is explained in [26].
Access Control and Provision of Authenticated Data
To control the data accessibility and visibility in the Tangle, MAM provides the following channel modes: (i) public: address=root i.e., by using the address of the message, any random user is able to decode it, (ii) private: address=hash(root) i.e., the hash of the Merkle root is used as the address thus, preventing random users from deciphering message as they are unable to derive the root from the hash, and (iii) restricted : address=hash(root)+authorization key i.e., the hash of the authorization key and the Merkle root is used as address thereby, allowing only authorized parties to read and reconstruct the data stream. Changing the authorization key results in revoking permission to access the data without requiring the data publisher to change its Channel ID . It is important to note that considering the confidential trade flow requirements of the SC players, we prefer the use of restricted channel mode of MAM. Furthermore, to enforce ownership of channel, signature validation is performed upon message reception to authenticate the source of the message or in other words to validate the ownership of the publisher. Failure to signature verification results in an invalid message. . Masked Payload consists of transaction data TData and auxiliary data AData, whereas PData can be constructed from TData and AData.
MAM Transaction Bundle

Proposed Framework: Provenance in SC
Seed Generation
To initiate the communication process based on address and private key, requires a seed. A seed is more like a private key and consists of 81 characters including upper case alphabets and digit 9. The seed generation process uses environmental noise (for example, device drivers, network packet timing etc.) as an input to a Cryptographic Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG), to produce random seed values. The process of seed generation is discussed in eq. 3.
Setting Security Level, Channel Mode, and Key Generation
IOTA has defined three security levels: 1 (low), 2 (medium), or 3 (high). The default security level is 2, however, we use the recommended security level 3.
To keep the communication confidential, we set the channel mode as "restricted " so that the authorized parties can access the data based on shared authorization key pairs.
K is used to encrypt and decrypt the payload by a sender and receiver entity respectively. The cryptographic keys can be shared among the participating parties by using any of the existing key exchange technique, for instance, RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). However, the existing key exchange systems are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, therefore, a lattice-based public key cryptosystem Nth Degree Truncated Polynomial Ring (NTRU) [27] must be adopted as it allows to generate and exchange key pairs in a quantum secure way. In our case, we use NTRU key exchange protocol.
Data Publishing
Each SC player creates a channel C to publish its data on the Tangle. For further details of the payload and its sub-entities, refer to Section 4.2. Upon selection of channel mode, security level, and authorization key, finally, the MAM transaction bundle is attached to the Tangle. The steps for creating a data publishing channel are shown in algorithm 1. Attach the payload to the Tangle.
Algorithm 1 Data Publishing
Data Receiving
The interested SC players subscribe to the channel to view the published data. The subscribers are able to receive payload based on Root and decipher the payload based on K as presented in algorithm 2. Recalling the notion "IOTA for IoT", it is important to mention that IOTA enables a flexible integration of the sensor data S Data in the Tangle, hence, the sensor data can be published, fetched and analyzed following the similar approach for data publishing and data receiving. Therefore, the sensor data, for instance, the consignment location information can be acquired accordingly.
Algorithm 2 Data Receiving
Provenance Data: Fetching and Aggregating Process
Collecting P Data consists of two steps: (i) fetching provenance (P f etch ), (ii) aggregating provenance (P aggr ). During the fetching process, T ID , P roduct ID , and Channel ID are used as the key identifiers to locate the chained information. Once the information is fetched using key identifiers, it is maintained as P aggr along with other granular details (including consignment information, timestamp, etc.). P aggr is then stored as P Data . Src ID refers to the channel address of the SC player who publishes the data through transaction P rev_T ID . Throughout the chain, Src ID helps in locating back to the intermediaries and ultimately the originator. Hence, moving to the next channel to fetch and aggregate provenance information is based on Src ID and P rev_T ID to obtain the respective transaction. The process of fetching and aggregating provenance continues until the supplier is found. The steps for fetching and aggregating provenance data from the Tangle are illustrated in algorithm 3. In order to explain the fetching and aggregating of P Data , let us consider Fig. 9 . Suppose that a non-participating SC player (customer or researcher) wants to trace back the product journey. Firstly, key identifiers are fetched i.e., T ID =SM-G8846, P roduct ID =R39H50JCOA, and Channel ID =R_ID: SK_SEL679 from the Retailer channel. Secondly, fetched data and auxiliary data are aggregated and collected in P Data . Thirdly, based on the Src ID =SK_SEL002 and P rev_T ID =SM-G4993, the provenance information (for instance, P ack ID = SKGIHP001), is then fetched from next Warehouse channel such that P rev_T ID equals T ID . Similarly, following P rev_T ID =SM-S7850 and Src ID =M_ID: SK_PYE001 the information related to batch B ID , model# and make is obtained from Manufacturing Unit channel. Here we can see that the batches holding components may arrive from different suppliers located in different countries. Hence, based on T ID =SM-S7850, B ID =SKPYEL01D and C ID =SKPYE100A information are obtained. Also Src ID =S_ID: SK_GIH003 is used to reach the respective Supplier channel. Since Src ID =NULL, therefore no further channel ID is required to fetch more information. It is important to note that the additional information can be fetched and aggregated from T Data and A Data based on the user's query. It is important to note that the query results also depends on access privileges defined by the SC players.
Simulation
We simulate the proposed provenance-based scheme for SC by using the current implementation of MAM protocol on a system having an Intel i5-3330 CPU @
Algorithm 3 Fetching and Aggregating Provenance Data from the Tangle
Mam.fetchSingle (root, restricted, K) Fetch a single transaction from the subscribed channel. 5:
payload= TData||AData Extract and decipher the payload.
6:
if (Ci == Retailer) then 7:
P f etch ← TID || P roductID || ChannelID Fetch data from TData.
8:
Paggr ← P f etch || AData Aggregate other granular details.
9:
PData ← Paggr 10:
goto SrcID channel Go to the intermediate source channel. 11:
look for P rev_TID == TID Look up for the transaction ID. 12:
P f etch ← TID || ChannelID Fetch data from TData. 14: while SrcID = NULL 21: end procedure 3.00GHz. In our simulation, we ignore the negligible time required to change the MAM mode and convert the message from bytes to trytes. We focused our analysis on the steps of attaching and fetching a message that has significant time delays. We compute the average time (ms) required to attach and fetch payload from the Tangle using MAM protocol. The results in Table 2 show that the average time to attach and fetch data has no correlation to payload size. Fig. 10 represents the distribution of data based on minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, maximum, and outliers for 15 trials with payload size ranging from 100 to 900 characters. It is important to note that the Attach phase: corresponds to attaching payload (consisting of T Data and A Data ) while the Fetch phase: corresponds to fetch and construct P Data from the fetched payload. Depending on the query criteria and access privileges defined on the basis of channel splitting, P Data can be constructed. For simplicity, we consider that the query acquires every possible detail (i.e., entire payload) during the fetch phase to derive provenance information.
Discussion: Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security claims and their justification to evaluate the performance of our proposed provenance-based scheme for SC.
Claim 1: Data Confidentiality. Justification: To conceal classified trade information among competitors, it is essential to encrypt data communication.
Claim 2: Channel Splitting. Justification: MAM channel enables off-shooting channel particularly when the entirety of data is not intended to be shared. Such fine-grained access to data are desired in many scenarios in SC. For example, the retailer may share the sales data or customer buying pattern data with the marketing companies while preserving the customer personally identifiable information (PII). Similarly, the idea of channel splitting can also be used to limit access to a company's trade secrets from joint ventures, suppliers, distributors or customers. Another significant use case example scenario is when one of the companies is buying some of its product's components from its competitor company.
To illustrate the process of fine-grained access through channel splitting, let's consider a scenario. Suppose, a seller S 1 (SID: SK_GIH003) is selling components (for instance, DRAM chips) to a buyer B 3 . S 1 also outsource its components to one of its partner sub-seller S sub (SID: CN_SHE005) who further sell components to other buyers B 1 and B 2 . S 1 and S sub define access control rights for their buyers so that they are able to retrieve required information from them. The information, in particular, can be generalized as T Data , A Data , Sales inf o (showing sales pattern), Client inf o (list of clients), M anuf acturing inf o (manufacturing process), Advertising inf o (advertising strategies). The defined policies and few example queries are discussed in Table 3 . The query results can be retrieved on the basis of provenance key elements i.e., T ID , P roduct ID , and Channel ID . Claim 3: Access Rights. Justification: Keeping in view the rivalry among electronics competitors, it is essential to share data with only legit entities. Thus, the data can only be access by authorized parties.
Related Work
Legacy systems: Enterprise Software Solutions for SC
Despite of massive investment by world's leading companies in deploying digital infrastructure to run computerized on-premise enterprise resource planning (ERP) and supply chain management software (SCMS) that enables the electronic tracking of products from their origins to the recycling bin, yet most of the companies are still squandering and frittering money and resources because of the inter and intra organizational analog gaps [34] . In addition to information discontinuity and desynchronization as a weak link, handling transactions are complex and rampant because each participant has his own ledger that may increase the possibility of human error or fraud whereas reliance on a middleman for validation leads to inefficiencies. Other factors include high cost of ERP software incurred during implementation, maintenance or upgrading as well as time-consuming customization process.
Cloud-based solution for SC
To bridge the fragmented siloed information across global partners, cloud computing solution (for instance, Software as a Service SaaS) are plugged into SC. Cloud-based solutions solve utmost issues in the legacy systems including agility, accessibility of complete and connected real-time provenance information. However, cloud computing in SC still facing stumbling block peculiarly storing the data or sensor values in a secure and confidential manner is still under question, for example, according to a report 8 concerning the adoption of supply chain management solutions in the cloud by Oracle, security remains a top concern. Cloud-based services are organization-specific and during product trading, provision to record the data on the cloud becomes solely the choice of the current product owner.
DLT-based Solution for Supply Chain
DLT, for instance, BC is a nascent technology that has the potential to solve important glitches in traceability and provenance challenges. BC technology allows companies to record every event within a supply chain on a distributed ledger that is shared among all participants and not owned by any and record events in a secure, immutable and irrevocable ways.
Recently, various worldwide enterprises have played a significant role in providing BC-based platforms for supporting friction-less traceability and transparency in SCs, for instance, IBM's blockchain framework [28] 8.3.1 Application Perspective: BC solution-approach in SC BC-based architecture for SC has been used in agriculture or food products [9] [10] [11] [12] , aviation industry, [13] , and many other uses cases discussed in [14] . However, the overall shortcomings associated with these approaches include portraying BC as a black box (i.e., lack of implementation details), scalability, accessibility, and auditability based on roles and access levels.
Conclusion
In this paper, we target two key challenging issues (i) disparate data repositories and (ii) untrustworthy data disseminating in the electronics supply chain space. To address these obstacles, we employ IOTA permissioned ledger that use MAM protocol as an application layer to allow distributed and trustworthy data accessible to only authorized SC players. By exploiting the MAM channel, the data publishers share their data securely while allowing the data receivers to access, analyze, and validate its ownership. Therefore, it is feasible to construct the product provenance story through trustworthy sources and immutable data streams flowing across the global supply chain. In addition to tracking exchanged transaction information, we also discuss the solution to integrate sensor data to circulate the consignment location information.
